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1. Introduction 
 
David Gauthier has perhaps done more than anyone to challenge the central dogma in the 
theory of instrumental rationality, that it is always rational to maximize one's individual 
expected utility. His arguments exploit situations where it maximizes for agents to intend 
to perform a certain action, but not to actually perform it. He thinks that since it 
maximizes to intend the actions, intending them is rational. An intention's rationality 
entails that of the act intended, even if it is non-maximizing. So it is not always rational 
to maximize.
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     It sounds simple. But as Gregory Kavka has taught us, these scenarios abound in 
paradox. It is extremely controversial how it would be rational to act in them, extremely 
contentious what they show about rationality, intention, and action. Kavka's classic 
scenario (the Deterrence Dilemma, or DD)
3
: Unless you, a nuclear superpower, really 
intend to all-out retaliate if all-out attacked by an enemy power, and unless this will guide 
your later behavior so your enemy will fear to attack, you will likely be attacked. Your 
only relevant preference is that harms to all be minimal. Intending would likely minimize 
harms for it would likely deter. So it maximizes. But if you are attacked, it does not 
maximize to retaliate; that would only cause pointless further harms. 
     Such cases raise, first, the intention problem: can one rationally acquire an intention it 
maximizes to acquire, but not to act upon; can one rationally intend to cause what one 
disprefers? Second, the action problem: if one could rationally acquire the intention, 
could one rationally act on it? These tend to raise, third, the link problem: does the 
rationality of an intention stand with that of the action intended? Fourth, the 
determination problem: if so, which decides their fate? 
     Kavka thinks the situation paradoxical, the choices partly linked. There is reason to 
intend for that maximizes, reason not to act for that does not. The irrationality of acting 
makes it impossible to directly and rationally come to intend, for one can't rationally 
intend an irrational act. Even if one could intend, the reason not to act still makes acting 
irrational; it is not maximizing. But no matter what one does, one's rationality is tainted; 
either one's actions or one's intentions are irrational: If one refrains from intending, one 
irrationally allows the harms of an attack. If one intends, one intends to do something 
irrational. If one intends and acts, one does something irrational from an intention it was 
rational to have (if not one directly rationally acquirable). If one intends and doesn't act, 
one refrains from an irrational act, but fails to conform to an intention it was rational to 
(somehow) acquire.
4
 Kavka sees a conflict between our criteria for the rationality of 
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persons, intentions, and actions. We say an intention is rational if the act intended is; an 
action, if it maximizes one's individual expected utility given one's preferences; a person, 
if his intentions and actions are rational. This is fine where intentions are parts of the 
actions intended, or have no other effect but to proximally cause actions. But where 
intentions are actions separate from those intended, or have separate effects, assessments 
of agents' rationality by the effects of their intentions conflict with assessments by the 
effects of the actions intended. 
     Gauthier tries to cut through these problems by suggesting that while rational agents 
must maximize, they need not always make maximizing choices. Sometimes it 
maximizes over-all if they adopt intentions, strategies, or policies later constraining them 
from making maximizing choices; in so adopting, they better serve their aims than by 
maximizing in every choice. Their actions are then rational if they express maximizing 
intentions. Thus that these actions aren't maximizing is neither an objection to intending 
to perform them and actually performing them, nor to an agent who both intends and acts 
on the intention being rational. Gauthier, then, thinks the DD shows an action needn't 
maximize to be rational; it need only express a disposition it maximized to adopt.
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     Does Gauthier's argument successfully resolve these paradoxes? I have recently 
argued that it does not in the analogous case of the Prisoners' Dilemma (where it 
maximizes to intend to co-operate with someone who would reciprocate if one so 
intended, but where it does not maximize to actually co-operate). Mark Vorobej has 
recently argued that Gauthier's argument does not work for the DD. Our arguments have 
a common structure. Here's Vorobej's: Even if actions are rational not if maximizing but 
if expressive of a maximizing disposition, it is still irrational both to intend and to act. For 
while the maximizing disposition to have pre-attack is retaliatory, the maximizing one to 
have post-is non-retaliatory. It would dictate non-retaliation. So retaliation is irrational. 
But since it is only rational to intend rational acts, and since retaliation is irrational, so is 
intending it. 
     I have not been able to shake the worry that this argument is too quick. In this paper, I 
consider a variety of ways Gauthier might be defended. I draw on some of his own 
speculations about the nature of rationality, intentions, choices and actions, and about the 
relation between one's preferences and one's reasons for action. I consider the possibility 
of extending his theory of rationality into a new theory of action, one which initially 
seems to afford Gauthier a reply to Vorobej and myself. I conclude, however, that 
Gauthier's argument simply cannot be made to work on its own terms. I claim that not 
only doesn't the DD falsify the maximizing conception of practical rationality, but that 
Gauthier's is really the same theory in different words. I do, however, think it is rational 
both to intend to retaliate and to actually retaliate in the DD. How can I believe this if I 
think Gauthier's argument does not work? I think that Gauthier and others in the field 
have been coming at the problem with a false assumption. 
     Gauthier and his critics have assumed that one can dispute the nature of rationality and 
the rationality of intentions and actions, given fixed preferences. But I argue that what is 
really at issue here is the rationality of preferences. I think DDs show that it is sometimes 
irrational to prefer as one does, namely, where it would maximize on one's current 
preference to have different preferences. Once we see that it is rational for one's 
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preferences to change in DDs, we will see that intending to retaliate and acting on that 
intention are rational. Yet the classical doctrines that it is rational to maximize, and that 
one can only intend and perform maximizing actions, are preserved. But decision theory, 
game theory, and our understanding of classical rationality need overhauling. For 
rationality really tells us not how to choose just given our preferences, but what we 
should prefer given what we now prefer, and how we should choose given what we 
should prefer. 
 
2. The Gauthier Arguments 
 
Gauthier thinks it rational to intend and to act. His thinking runs as follows.
6
 First, a 
preamble establishing the prima facie rationality of intending: 
     (G1) Were it irrational to intend, a free and rational agent could not advantage himself 
by deterrence, for he could not credibly threaten. But a rational action maximizes. 
Intending maximizes, so it must be rational. 
     Now Gauthier thinks an intention is rational only if the act intended is too. So he gives 
two transcendental arguments for the derivative rationality of acting: 
     (G2) It is impossible to rationally intend the irrational. It is possible and rationally 
obligatory to intend to retaliate. So retaliation must be rational. 
     (G3) Intending is rational only if it would deter. It would only deter if it would 
probably cause retaliation. It would only do that, if its agent stayed rational, free and 
well-informed, if retaliation were rational. Since it is rational to intend in a way that 
would induce retaliation, retaliation must be rational. 
     These sound like bad arguments. They have the form: it would advantage you were x 
true, so x must be true. Non sequitur. Moreover their conclusion is prima facie false. It is 
not maximizing to act. It is thus irrational to act. It is not possible to rationally intend an 
irrational act. It is thus impossible to rationally intend. Or, if it is somehow possible, it 
remains irrational to act. We may wish it were rational to intend and even to act, were 
that necessary to its being rational to intend. But that doesn't show either is rational. 
     Is this a fair reductio? Perhaps not. Perhaps it works against arguments for a 
proposition's truth, but not against ones for an action's rationality. Perhaps the very scope 
of the rational, unlike the true, is constructed from the concept of the maximizing. If 
action x maximizes, x is rational. If action y's being causable by x is necessary to x's 
being rational, y too must be rational. x maximizes, so y must be rational. 
     Allright; perhaps if x maximizes, x is rational. But it does not follow from x being 
rational only if it can cause y that if x is rational, so is y--only that y must be causable by 
x. x can be maximizing even if y isn't; thus x can be rational even if y isn't. Thus, x's 
rationality doesn't entail y's, even where x induces y. Moreover, if x was rational only if y 
was if x causes y, then if y is irrational, x is too, even if maximizing. Or perhaps we have 
conflicting standards of an action's rationality, vis., its being maximizing, vs. its being 
caused by something maximizing: what of things caused by maximizing things, but not 
themselves maximizing? What, in short, of Kavka's paradox? 
     Gauthier thinks this objection misconstrues what rationality requires of an agent in a 
DD. The objection has a false premise, that it is always irrational to perform a non-
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maximizing action. Thus: 
     (G4) Classically, rational actions must maximize. But some possible actions involve 
revising one's nature. E.g., consider one's dispositions to choose. A classical or 
Straightforward Maximizer (SMer) is disposed to maximize in each choice. He can't 
rationally retaliate, for that is not maximizing. If rationally intending retaliation requires 
retaliation to be rational, he can't intend; nor then can he avail himself of a credible 
deterrent intention. But suppose instead that, in choosing actions, he first chose policies, 
intentions, strategies, whatever (call them "dispositions"), the having of which 
maximized. And suppose he tended to act on these (for otherwise, he couldn't advantage 
himself with them; no one would fear that he would act on them, and it might be 
senseless even to say he had them). It would advantage him to choose a retaliatory 
disposition, for it would be a credible deterrent if he could be relied upon to act on it, as 
he could if he tended to act on his dispositions. Now suppose that he is, initially, an 
SMer, but has the option to be a Disposition Maximizer (DMer), one who always first 
chooses the maximizing disposition, then chooses from it. It would be maximizing 
(because deterring) and so rational for him to become a DMer with a retaliatory 
disposition. Thereafter, Gauthier thinks he will retaliate. 
     This may establish the rationality of intending or being disposed to retaliate, and of 
becoming someone who acts on his dispositions. But does it make so acting rational? Or 
does it merely prove it rational to adopt dispositions to cause what are really irrational 
behaviors? Gauthier thinks that to say it is rational to intend is to say it is rational to act. 
So it would be inconsistent to grant the rationality of intending to retaliate but not of 
retaliation, like saying it is both right and not right to retaliate. So if we grant it is rational 
to intend, we must grant that it is rational to act (provided nothing changes about one's 
circumstances, apart from the conditionally anticipated fact of one's intention failing to 
achieve the end for which it was adopted); indeed, he thinks an action inherits rationality 
from that of the disposition or intention to so act. Call this (following Mark Vorobej
7
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who follows Derek Parfit) the Inheritance Principle (IP). 
     But surely someone who now acts on an old policy is irrational if implementing it isn't 
maximizing? Gauthier thinks not. At worst, he is acting in an "irrational manner," i.e., 
without further deliberation. He needn't reconsider what to do; he has a policy, and he 
executes it. This is rational were it rational to adopt a policy to act non-deliberatively, as 
it was. 
     Gauthier's critics will accuse him of bad faith on the rationality of actions
8
; he calls 
actions rational even though dispreferred (or with dispreferred consequences), if dictated 
by an expedient disposition. He may reply that his critics are rascals for counting inutile 
intentions as rational; intending not to retaliate courts attack, even if it saves the agent 
from intending a dispreferred action, or one with a dispreferred consequence. Gauthier 
thinks then that classical rationality must acknowledge the rationality of intending, this 
entailing that of acting. Thus non-maximizing actions can be rational. 
 
3. Vorobej's Replies to Gauthier 
 
Mark Vorobej accepts Dispositional Rationality (DR) and IP.
9
 But he notes that while it 
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maximizes to have a policy of retaliation pre-attack, it maximizes to have one of non-
retaliation after. So even if, pre-attack, one had the policy of retaliating, one should 
abandon it after. Moreover, granting it is rational to do whatever is rationally intended, 
not only is it irrational to act, it is irrational to intend. For by DR it would have become 
irrational to retaliate post-attack, since the disposition it would then maximize to adopt 
would be nonretaliatory. By IP, if it is rational to intend, it is rational to act. But since it is 
not rational to retaliate, by modus tollens, it is not rational to intend it. 
     Anticipating, Gauthier replied: it is wrong to think that because retaliation is an 
irrational action--because not maximizing--intending retaliation is an irrational 
disposition. Rather, because intending is rational--because maximizing--retaliating is 
rational. But Vorobej sees one man's modus ponens as another's modus tollens. Gauthier's 
reply would be that one must evaluate the rationality of retaliating by that of the 
retaliatory disposition because, in a DD, the choice of retaliatory disposition comes 
temporally first, when it maximizes. But Vorobej could respond that a problem of choice 
among dispositions rearises before the final choice among actions. (Otherwise, one may 
not be freely choosing at the point of final choice among actions; one is merely the slave 
of an earlier choice among dispositions. More below.) 
     This objection is very compelling. For even if it is maximizing to intend, even in 
Gauthian rationality that seems separate from whether it will be rational to keep intending 
post-attack. The conditions making a disposition maximizing might change, and indeed, 
do so post-attack. Now Gauthier thinks that since this was originally considered in 
choosing earlier the disposition to retaliate, recalculating later is illicit double counting. 
But this is wrong. For before, both deterrence and retaliation were possible consequences 
of a rational choice of disposition. But now, deterrence is impossible, retaliation and its 
dispreferred harms certain without a change in attitudes. So the conditions determining 
rational dispositions pre-and post-attack are different. 
     Granted, a rational DMer acts on maximizing dispositions rather than choosing 
directly maximizing actions. But if a disposition has not had its designed effect, should a 
rational DMer conform to it, retaliating? Or should he (if he could) rechoose dispositions, 
choose a non-retaliatory one post-attack, and not retaliate? If a disposition is rational only 
if maximizing, then if it ceases to be, one must abandon it for whichever one would now 
maximize, in this case, one requiring non-retaliation. To act on it would be to not 
retaliate. So retaliating is irrational even in DR. 
     Gauthier will say I misconceive the DMer. He would not recalculate the best 
disposition at each moment. Rather, after noting the consequences of possible 
dispositions, he would choose a currently maximizing one and then abide by it, even if it 
failed in its desired effect, so long as he considered this chance in his original choice. It is 
rational to become someone who stands by old dispositions. Otherwise, one's retaliatory 
disposition can't deter--no one will believe one would act on it. But this reply has the 
same problem. Just as the maximizing disposition post-attack is non-retaliatory, so the 
maximizing kind of agent to be then is one who recalculates/ rechooses dispositions when 
he has an outdated one which can only be followed now at the cost of performing a 
pointless non-maximizing action (or, in Gauthier's terms, one no longer expressing a 
maximizing disposition, since the disposition it expresses has ceased to maximize). 
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Vorobej's objection returns. Even DR would be known to dictate non-retaliation post-
attack. Thus, the DMer knows pre-attack that even he will have reason not to retaliate 
post-. Thus if it is only rational to intend rational acts, since retaliation is irrational, so is 
intending it. 
     Gauthier would reply, of course, that it only maximizes to be a DMer if DMers act on 
their dispositions in the conditions considered in rationalizing their adoption. It is 
maximizing and so rational to adopt one only if it will guide post-attack choices. So it 
must be rational to act on it. But it seems impossible, even by DR, to rationally act in a 
non-maximizing way post-attack; the non-maximizing effects then of the retaliatory 
disposition require abandoning it then and so not acting on it. Knowing this, and given IP, 
one can't rationally intend to retaliate. 
 
4. The Nature of Intentions and the Rationality of Actions 
 
But perhaps we are overlooking something. Assume that if one intends, one will act, 
perhaps because acting will then somehow be rational, perhaps only because the intention 
will make one act in a way normally irrational. It maximizes to adopt an act-guaranteeing 
retaliatory intention. Might intending somehow convey rationality to the action intended? 
That depends on what an intention is. 
     (a) Perhaps to intend to do x at time t is just to desire to do something with a certain 
character, F, at t, and to believe of x that it would have F at t. But our agent prefers not to 
cause gratuitous harms, and believes retaliating will cause them. So retaliation is 
irrational. How then can he rationally intend it?
10
 
     (b) Perhaps an intention is like a promise made to oneself. If one cared to keep 
promises, one would have reason to retaliate in having promised oneself one would. But 
our agent does not care to keep promises; only that harms be minimal. (Gauthier himself 
stipulates this.) He thus has no reason to keep a promise, so the promise could not deter. 
And knowing its pointlessness, he could not even sincerely make it.
11
 
     (c) Perhaps to intend is to have a conclusive reason to act. (Gauthier sometimes seems 
to think of intentions this way.) So perhaps that one has intended gives one a reason 
sufficient to justify carrying through, especially if one has come to so regard it, has 
adopted a conception of rationality in which it is decisive (as Gauthier recommends). But 
post-attack, one has no instrumental justification for regarding one's pre-attack intention 
as decisive; that can only cause retaliation and gratuitous harms, contrary to the 
continuing preference that harms be minimal. Thus one has (knowingly or not) 
conclusive reason post-attack to revert to being someone who does not regard one's 
original intention to retaliate as decisive. Besides, at best, we have here reason to get 
oneself to believe that something is a good reason to retaliate. But that needn't mean it is 
one; it may only justify bad faith, willful irrationality. Moreover, it is odd to think of 
intentions as being themselves reasons, conclusive or otherwise. Rather, intentions are 
either what one acquires when one takes oneself to have conclusive reasons for action 
(but the intention is not itself a reason), or intentions are complexes of reasons for 
actions--i.e., complexes of beliefs and desires, desires to perform actions with a certain 
character or consequence, beliefs that the action intended would have that character or 
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consequence--but intentions are not themselves reasons for action additional to one's 
beliefs and desires. And as we saw in the reply to proposal (a), above, the beliefs and 
desires we assume the agent to have in the DD do not appear to justify him in retaliating 
post-attack. 
     (d) Perhaps to intend to x at t is to cease to be reflective about what to do at t, so that 
one acts at t in a non-reflective way; thus one does not revise one's intention at t, but 
merely acts on it. One's mind is already made up. (This is something which Gauthier 
himself suggests at one point.) But one will have every reason, post-attack, to be 
reflective, for that would cause one to revise one's intentions, preventing the gratuitous 
harms of acting unreflectively on one's prior intention. (One may, in committing to 
retaliation, have deadened oneself to these considerations. But insofar, surely one would 
not then, as Gauthier wants, be freely, voluntarily, informedly and rationally choosing 
post-attack to retaliate. Rather, one would be "choosing" in a non-rational daze, if 
perhaps in one it was rational to enter.) 
     (e) Gauthier tends to use terms like "intention," "disposition," "strategy," "plan," 
"policy," etc., interchangeably. But we might advance by distinguishing between a 
disposition and an intention. It may be a condition on rationally adopting an intention that 
the act intended is independently classically rational, i.e., maximizing. But what of 
dispositions? They may be not so much attitudes towards actions (ones needing to be 
rational to cause rational actions), as mere habits of choice, reflexes, brain mechanisms 
empowered to cause behaviors. We might then speak of the rationality of adopting a 
disposition independently of that of the behaviors it causes, much as we can speak of the 
rationality of, say, building a machine, independently of its rationality. Here, a 
disposition is simply a causal determinant of later behavior, an irrevocable reflex, habit, 
deadman switch. And agents should adopt whichever irrevocable, behavior-determining 
mechanism would maximize. It will then cause them to behave independently of their 
preferences (or at least not as straightforward maximizers on their preferences) when it 
activates.
12
 
 
5. Dispositions as Mechanisms 
 
Perhaps we can now beat Vorobej's objection to the rationality of disposing oneself to 
retaliate. These things are like doomsday machines, but in people's heads. Vorobej's 
objection applied here would be that since no one wants a doomsday device to go off, 
subterranean or subcranial, it is irrational to acquire one. But one does not adopt it 
because one wants it to go off simpliciter, only to minimize the chance of large harms. Its 
chance of going off is acceptably low relative to the expectable benefits of having it. 
Vorobej would be conflating the low utility of it going off with the high expected utility 
of adopting it. And were dispositions just mechanisms, Gauthier would escape Kavka's 
objections to the rationality of having a retaliatory disposition from the irrationality of 
acting on it. For the agent (qua straightforward expressor of a set of preferences 
concurrent with an action) needn't be able to act (in that sense) on the disposition to 
rationally have it. It executes itself (or the agent does, but somehow without requiring 
immediate approval of his then preferences).
13
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     This distinguishes what one can directly intend to do from what one can only arrange 
to have done. It is like a suggestion of Kavka's, that deterrence does not require what 
appears to be a rationally impossible intention to retaliate, but is attainable by a rational 
"delegation" of the final "decision."
14
 The agent can arrange actions he can't himself 
perform, hire killers where he can't himself kill, build machines which will inevitably do 
what he could not bring himself to do directly, induce in himself extinction-resistant, 
non-reflective dispositions which will by-pass his preferences in guiding his behaviors. 
Here, the agent qua immediate preference-expressor never has to (classically) choose 
post-attack to do his own dirty work. His inner doomsday machine uses his body as a 
retaliatory instrument. He is not, post-attack, (classically) rationally choosing retaliation, 
of course--merely being guided by the mechanism he chose pre-attack. 
     Here, the arrangements and the intentions to adopt them have the same effects. The 
advantages are evident in variations on Kavka's Toxin Puzzle
15
: You are offered 
$1Million to intend tonight to drink a temporarily nauseating poison tomorrow, but can 
get the $1Million even if you do not drink. Compare: you are virtually guaranteed there 
will be no harms if you intend tonight to retaliate if attacked tomorrow, but can get the 
guarantee even if you do not retaliate. Perhaps you can not rationally intend either to 
drink or to retaliate, for you disprefer their consequences. But now suppose you are 
offered $1Million if you will drink the poison right now. Compare: you are guaranteed 
harms will likely be minimized if you will, right now, press a button on a doomsday 
machine, guaranteeing retaliation if attacked. Now can you intend to drink the poison, to 
press the button? Sure, for the balance of reasons favor the action, and so (rationally) 
should cause an immediate intention to perform it. You will rationally perform it from a 
rational intention. 
     You can arrange for what you can't directly intend. For arranging for a retaliation 
should there be an attack, and retaliating after an attack (independently of any pre-attack 
commitments), are different actions. So they involve different intentions. (Were they the 
same, if an agent could do one he could do both. He can only do one so they must be 
different.) The difference: The rationality of intending depends on the expected utility of 
the act intended, while that of arranging for an event depends on the expected utility of so 
arranging. This, of course, depends in part on the utility of the event arranged, but also on 
its likelihood. The low chance of the harms of retaliation plus the high chance of the 
prevention of all harms by the arrangement make the arrangement maximizing and so 
preferable, even if the events conditionally arranged are not. 
     Now, of course, this does not show the rationality of intending the originally 
problematic action, but of intending to arrange. It does not prove the rationality of 
intending where that requires retaliation to be independently (classically) rational. But 
Gauthier wants retaliation itself to be rational action. Can it so count if caused by these 
mechanisms? On first glance, no. The agent may choose the mechanism freely and 
rationally, but it seems implausible to say he thereafter chooses at all, especially freely, 
never mind rationally. But just as Gauthier argues for a new conception of rationality (or 
for a consequence of the old), so perhaps we must accept a new conception of freely 
chosen, voluntary action (or, again, a consequence of the old). Just as retaliation may be 
rational because intending it maximizes, so perhaps retaliating from a retaliatory 
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mechanism may be free and rational action, since it would express a disposition freely 
and rationally chosen.  
     If so, Gauthier might not just escape its being irrational to form the disposition to 
retaliate--because irrational (on the old definition) to retaliate--by mooting the rationality 
of retaliating from the mechanism. Rather, he may conceive it as rational in a different 
way: Its straightforward (SM) rationality becomes irrelevant. It is only SM rational to 
adopt the retaliatory disposition, not to retaliate. But it is DR rational to retaliate if that is 
decided not by its first-order rationality, but by that of the second-order choice of 
permanent disposition, a choice made pre-attack. Here, it is sufficient for retaliation at t2 
= post-attack being a rational action that the adoption of an irrevocable mechanism to 
cause it is rational at t1 = pre-attack. (Henceforth "permanent" and "irrevocable" mean 
"permanent/ irrevocable in the envisaged circumstances.") With permanent mechanisms, 
it is unnecessary for it being rational at t1 to adopt a retaliatory mechanism that that 
would be rational at t2. Rationality for unrevocable dispositions is different from that for 
classical intentions. The combination of IP and DR as originally formulated for them is 
vulnerable to Vorobej; but if we accept the irrevocable mechanism interpretation of the 
disposition, that formulation is not Gauthier's intent. Instead, he defends retaliation by the 
principle that an action is rational at t2 just if dictated by the irrevocable disposition 
maximizing to adopt at t1. This may seem ad hoc, but it seems to yield Gauthier's desired 
result. If t1 = any time pre-attack, t2 = any time post-, adoption of the disposition seems 
rational at t1, as does retaliation at t2. 
     Unfortunately, what makes this a plausible defense of Gauthier is also its undoing. For 
it is doubtful, first, whether retaliation here is really an action (rational or otherwise) 
freely and voluntarily chosen and performed at the time of retaliation, even extending 
Gauthier's rationality into a new conception of action; second, whether retaliation is 
rational even by this new standard. 
 
6. Irrevocable Dispositions and Action 
 
Gauthier thinks of retaliation from a retaliatory disposition as an action voluntarily, 
freely, and rationally chosen post-attack. But is it even an action? Maybe not. For (on our 
current interpretation of Gauthier) it issues from dispositions conceived simply as 
mechanisms which cause behaviors independently of their bearer's preferences at the time 
of retaliation (TR). These are just doomsday devices, but in people's heads. And when a 
nation's doomsday machine self-activates, surely no one has, at that time, chosen and 
performed a retaliatory action, let alone a rational one. For action chosen and performed 
now is, normally, informed behavior from a preference concurrent with or just prior to 
that behavior. (Rational action is behavior one concurrently or just previously 
instrumentally prefers because it maximizes.
16
) At TR, the disposition makes the agent do 
things he would rather not do (i.e., cause retaliation's harms). So retaliation is not action. 
     One can, however, argue that it is an action. For retaliation here would be behavior 
from a disposition adopted because of instrumental preferences that it be adopted, ones 
themselves rational because for something--a deterring disposition--maximizing given 
one's preferences pre-attack. One preferred the disposition, and since one foreknew its 
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possible conditional effects, surely one conditionally preferred them too. Thus retaliation 
does issue from one's preferences--the preferences to adopt the disposition--and so should 
count as action, or at least as part of an action (a rather "fat" one), that of adopting the 
disposition. Proof: Adoption of the disposition is an action. It consists in determining that 
retaliation will occur given an attack. So retaliation is or is part of the action of 
disposition adoption if there is an attack. Details: If retaliation is or is part of the action of 
the adoption of the disposition, it must satisfy or partly satisfy the same preference as that 
for the disposition. (Actions are behaviors caused and rationalized by preferences and so 
are the same just if caused and rationalized by the same ones.) The preference for the 
specific action of retaliating and that which immediately rationalized adopting the 
disposition, the preference to adopt it, are the same just if the same events would satisfy 
them. (That is how preferences get individuated.) Those are the same just if necessarily 
they exactly overlap spatiotemporally. (That is how events get individuated.)
17
 Now the 
preference to adopt the disposition is satisfied by a change in the bearer's psychological 
dispositions; the preference to retaliate, by launching some missiles. These may thus 
seem to be different events, for it seems one could occur without the other. But if one 
prefers "a mechanism that will retaliate upon attack," the event satisfying the preference 
to adopt it must be one which includes retaliation by the mechanism given an attack. 
Otherwise, one would not have adopted "a mechanism that will retaliate upon attack."  So 
the mechanism's retaliation must be in the scope of the preference to adopt it. Thus if 
adopting it is an action, then the mechanism's retaliation is or is part of it given an attack. 
(It is a "soft fact" whether adopting the disposition is or has as a part, retaliating. If there 
is no attack, they are separate events; if there is an attack, the latter is or is part of the 
former.) Thus both the disposition's adoption and retaliation if there is an attack satisfy 
the same preferences. So the preference to adopt the retaliatory disposition is the 
preference to retaliate if attacked. Therefore, retaliation is or is part of the same action as 
adoption of the retaliatory disposition if there is an attack. Thus, it is made rational and 
voluntary action by the disposition's adoption being rational and voluntary. 
     Now this may establish that retaliation is or is a part of, a rational and voluntary 
action, but maybe not one chosen post-attack. For while nations with rationally chosen 
doomsday devices, and people with rationally chosen doomsday reflexes are responsible 
for their devices' effects, this is not because those effects are actions chosen and 
performed at TR, but because they are parts of actions begun before attack (at TA--Time 
of initial disposition Adoption).
18
 
     But this is just refusing to allow Gauthier his new rationality. For if rational choice is 
choice from a maximizing disposition, the definition of action must change to fit: an 
action is not a behavior shaped by concurrent preferences, but by a concurrent 
disposition. So retaliation counts as action on the account which seems to flow from 
Gauthier's rationality: it is a behavior shaped by a rationally chosen disposition 
concurrent with or immediately proximal to, the retaliatory behavior. Retaliation might 
thus seem to be not only an action, but one which, in Gauthier's new sense, is chosen and 
performed at TR. And we might even have to count it as voluntary (in his new sense), 
since it issues from a disposition voluntarily chosen at TA. 
     But there is another sense in which it fails to satisfy even this extended conception of 
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action, for it doesn't issue from the disposition the agent would volunteer to have, 
choosing at TR, using DR. To see this and its relevance, we must consider again the 
rationality of retaliation by Gauthier's standards. 
 
 
 
7. Rationality and Irrevocable Dispositions 
 
If Gauthier's is a fully generalizable principle of rationality, it must give consistent results 
in all applications. Consider now the following times: t1 = pre-attack, t2 = just after 
attack when one is deciding whether to retaliate, t3 = the time at which one will retaliate, 
if one is going to. t2 is later than t1, t3 later than t2. Suppose we apply Gauthier's 
principle that it is rational to do whatever it maximized to be disposed to do, at t1 
regarding t3; we get Gauthier's result: it is rational at t1 to adopt, at t1, a disposition to 
retaliate at t3, and prospectively rational (from the vantage of t1) to retaliate at t3. 
Suppose now though that, having applied the principle at t1, we try to apply it at t2, just 
after attack, regarding a final decision of whether to retaliate slightly later, at t3. We will 
be rational in retaliating at t3 relative to t1's choice. But the principle applied at t2 for t3 
would say to adopt, at t2, the disposition re t3 maximizing at t2. That disposition would, 
of course, be non-retaliatory, since, by t2, an attack has already occurred and there is no 
longer any point to having a retaliatory disposition: it would only cause more dispreferred 
harms. Thus the principle now recommends non-retaliation at t3. But one can't conform 
to the principle applied at t2 re t3, because one is, by hypothesis, irresistibly governed by 
the disposition adopted at t1 re t3. One may have an excuse for retaliating, but still, 
barring ad hoc restrictions on substitutions for the time of choice of disposition and the 
time at which the disposition is directed, the principle that it is rational to act on the 
disposition it was maximizing to adopt supports "rational" obligations to the conjoint 
performance of mutually exclusive actions. It is as much a recipe for cognitive 
dissonance and for behavior which will be in some important sense, unfree and irrational 
by t3, as it is a recipe for the rational choice of disposition at t1, and a rationalizer of 
retaliation at t3. It demands that we arrange at t1 for it to be impossible to refrain from 
retaliating at t3, and then to arrange at t2 not to retaliate at t3. If we do either, we can't do 
the other. So it is incoherent as a general principle of rationality. 
     Gauthier tried to show how retaliation from a retaliatory disposition would be free, 
voluntary, autonomous, and rational action chosen and initiated at TR.
19
 To this end, he 
offered DR (it is rational to do whatever it was rational to be disposed to do) and IP (a 
behavior inherits rationality from that of the disposition causing it). But these are not 
really defenses of the claim that retaliation is rational from a disposition to retaliate, only, 
at best, mere statements of it. And DR as presently understood, seems not even to imply 
that retaliation would be (unequivocally) rational. For it seems to license reversion, post-
attack, to a non-retaliatory disposition (whether this can be done or not--the principle is 
not sensitive to impossibilities). Moreover, since there are two possible pre-retaliation 
dispositions--the pre-attack one to retaliate, the post-attack one to refrain--IP gives 
conflicting recommendations about which should guide one's action. Does retaliating 
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inherit rationality from that of the retaliatory disposition, or does refraining inherit it from 
that of the disposition to refrain? In any event, Kavka finds IP indefensible, while 
Vorobej thinks that it proves the irrationality of adopting the retaliatory disposition. For it 
finally recommends non-retaliation from the non-retaliatory disposition it is rational to 
adopt post-attack. Since, by IP, if it is rational to be disposed to do something, it is 
rational to act on that disposition, and since we have just seen that it is not rational to act 
on the retaliatory disposition (because it would, rather, be rational to act on the post-
attack disposition to refrain from retaliating), by modus tollens, it must not be rational to 
be disposed to retaliate either. Thus it is irrational to adopt a disposition which would 
cause retaliation. 
     We can see now why retaliation is not only not a rational action, but not an action 
freely and voluntarily chosen post-attack. For then, the maximizing disposition is non-
retaliatory, even though, pre-attack, retaliatory. Thus, if one retaliates (from one's pre-
attack mechanism), one behaves the wrong way even by what DR standards would later 
require. DR yields an incoherent standard of the voluntariness of action, and of whether 
an action has been chosen contemporaneously with the time of the behavior which is to 
count as action. For an action is both voluntarily and contemporaneously chosen by the 
standard of issuing from a maximizing (because irrevocable in the circumstances) 
disposition chosen at t1 = pre-attack re t3 = post-attack, but is neither by the standard of 
issuing from the maximizing disposition one should choose at t2 = just post-attack re t3 = 
just pre-choice of whether to retaliate. This is so precisely because of Gauthier's taking 
the rationality of retaliation to be decided by whether it issues from a maximizing 
disposition. 
     Perhaps one's having preferred the disposition makes retaliation at least part of an 
action initiated by or consisting in part in, the disposition's adoption. But that does not 
make it an action both chosen and performed post-attack; only, at best, one initiated long 
before under different conditions, one it would now (post-attack) be irrational to choose 
to perform, and which one rationally would now have to truncate if one could. In that 
sense, it is not now voluntary. It finds one doing something one ought now to choose not 
to do, and which one would now choose not to do, if one could.
20
 
 
8. The Gauthier Replies 
 
Gauthier would make three replies. First, we misinterpret DR. The DR agent chooses 
from the disposition the having of which maximizes, but not necessarily the one 
maximizing at TR. He can rationally choose from the one it maximized to adopt when the 
conditions under which a final choice among actions would be made were merely 
prospective. Even though, post-attack, the rational disposition is non-retaliatory, it can 
remain rational to choose from the one it was rational to adopt pre-attack. It is rational to 
act on a rational plan about how to act. 
     But there two relevant occasions when the final choice among actions is prospective, 
namely, before attack, and just after, but just before retaliation. One can thus plan anew. 
And while it was rational pre-attack to dispose oneself to retaliate when the final choice 
among actions was still in the future, it is rational post-attack to dispose oneself to non-
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retaliation given that there has been an attack, where the final choice among actions is 
still ahead. There seem then to be two possible dispositions prior to the final choice 
among actions that compete for being the correct determinant. And I can think of no non-
ad hoc way of arguing that the non-retaliatory one should not govern one's behavior post-
attack. For it maximizes at TR, is temporally closest to whichever action is to be chosen, 
and is in every other way the one which would normally be relevant as an intention 
serving as the rational determinant of an action. (This makes it impossible to deter with 
the retaliatory disposition pre-attack if one could shed it post-; but as we saw, being 
moved by this is just wishful thinking.) 
     Indeed, surely one decides whether a disposition continues to be rational to have and 
act on by whether it maximizes to (continue to) have it. That, after all, was the basis for 
choosing Gauthier's preferred disposition at TA. It ceased to maximize to be a SMer 
bereft of a retaliatory disposition at TA, which was why one became a DMer with a 
retaliatory disposition. How can one satisfy the rational obligation to always choose, and 
to choose from, a maximizing disposition, while choosing from one that is non-
maximizing post-attack? And doesn't it cease to maximize to be a CMer with a retaliatory 
disposition at TR? 
     Nonetheless, mightn't it have been rational to make an irrevocable commitment to a 
retaliatory disposition (irrevocable as a matter of causal fact, that is; for it is not clear 
how one could render it rationally irrevocable)?; otherwise, it would not deter. Whether 
one can rationally do this in Gauthier's scheme, however, is still doubtful, because it may 
result in a non-maximizing behavior which one could, post-attack, neither directly intend 
(by SM) nor retain a rational disposition to perform (even by DR, applied post-attack) 
given one's preferences. As we saw earlier, even in DR, by the time of possible 
retaliation, one is rationally obliged to be disposed not to retaliate; it is therefore 
irrational to retaliate; since, if it is rational to be disposed to retaliate it must be rational to 
retaliate, and since it is not rational to retaliate, it cannot be rational to be disposed to 
retaliate either. In any case, whether it is rational pre-attack to adopt a disposition one 
cannot revoke post-attack is separate from whether it would be rational to revoke it if one 
were given that option post-attack. And nothing in either standard rationality or in 
Gauthier's alternative suggests that that is not the relevant counter-factual in deciding the 
rationality of anything able to count as a genuine choice post-attack (however much 
Gauthier would like it to be otherwise.) It seems it would be rational to revoke it, for a 
disposition is made rational, on Gauthier's own account, by its being maximizing, and the 
retaliatory one isn't, post-attack. 
     Gauthier's second response: we beg the question against him in evaluating the 
rationality of both action and disposition by whether each now serves the agent's current 
preferences. Rather, to be rational is to evaluate choices (on their rationality, and, 
presumably, their freedom, voluntariness, status as genuine actions, and status as now-
chosen actions) not by one's current preferences, but by one's rationally chosen 
dispositions. Indeed, he may think that further possible dispositions should be evaluated 
by whether their adoption expresses the original one. And of course, the retaliatory one 
would not be expressed in revoking it here. 
     But surely the only possible argument for its being rational to evaluate an action or 
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disposition by its concordance with an earlier-adopted disposition, is that the earlier one 
is rational, the one it is currently rational to have guide action. Gauthier's own standard 
for the rationality of a disposition is whether having it maximizes. And while the 
retaliatory disposition was a rational (because maximizing) one to have adopted pre-
attack, it is not rational to have it post-(for it no longer maximizes). So by Gauthier's 
standard for whether a disposition and choice from one is rational--vis., whether the 
disposition is maximizing, the choice, one expressing a maximizing disposition--the 
retaliatory one is not rational post-attack; nor then is retaliation. 
     True, it would maximize to adopt the retaliatory disposition if it would guide post-
attack behavior. And it would confirm the rationality of deterrence and of action on 
deterrence policy were it then rational to use that disposition in the final decision of 
whether to retaliate. But surely that it would be pre-attack maximizing were that the 
rationally correct disposition to use does not by itself make it correct. Indeed, if Gauthier 
is not to beg the question, he must offer a standard of the rationality of a disposition other 
than that it would be maximizing if it were rational. And he has: a disposition is rational 
if maximizing, a choice of action, if it expresses the maximizing disposition. But by that 
standard, it is neither rational post-attack to have a retaliatory disposition, nor to choose 
from it. 
     Finally, Gauthier will claim that if the agent is to rationally deter by threat of rational 
retaliation, he must adopt a disposition which makes it rational to retaliate; otherwise, it 
would not maximize to adopt it (for an agent who will later choose rationally). But this 
does not establish that there is a disposition whose adoption rationalizes retaliation, only 
that it would maximize were there one. 
     Gauthier would find these objections maddening. For the whole point of adopting a 
disposition is to secure a later behavior it is earlier advantageous to have secured; yet it 
would seem that, later, it is the wrong disposition to have guide one's behaviors. 
     One might conclude that it is impossible to rationally and efficaciously plan now to 
rationally perform inutile future actions in paradoxical choice situations. For while there 
is advantage to adoption of the plan, there is no advantage to action upon it. But I think 
this only shows that rationally committing to such plans must have a different character 
than Gauthier thought. It must consist in one's preferences rationally changing so as to 
make compliance with the commitment/plan classically rational. 
 
9. Rational Plans in Paradoxical Choice Situations; The Rational Preference to Retaliate 
 
Gauthier's conclusions can be saved from Vorobej's and Kavka's objections, if we 
interpret the retaliatory disposition as a set of preference-functions on which it maximizes 
to retaliate.
21
 Here, one again faces a second-order choice problem. But one chooses 
among preference-functions over outcomes or actions (i.e., among orderings of outcomes 
and actions from most to least preferred). One chooses from one's original preferences for 
outcomes of choice and one's beliefs about the strategic effects of having new 
preferences. One should adopt whichever ones would deter, i.e., ones maximization on 
which requires retaliating. E.g., one becomes such that one prefers that harms be minimal 
unless one is attacked, in which case, one prefers to retaliate. Enemies would then be 
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deterred, seeing one would then find it rational (because maximizing given one's new 
values) to retaliate. Since one has such preference-functions, one must retaliate if 
attacked, as a rational SMer. 
     Note that the new preference-orderings serve all the roles Gauthier wished for 
dispositions: it is deterring and so maximizing to adopt them; it is rational to retaliate 
from them, since they are preferences to retaliate; their very adoption conveys rationality 
to retaliating (vindicating IP for this type of choice); rationality proves to require that 
choices be made on the basis of a second-order choice among determinants of further 
choice. But the principle which justifies adopting these bases of further choice--vis., that 
one should always maximize on whichever preferences one has at the time of choice--is 
coherent in these applications: it maximizes to adopt new preferences pre-attack, 
maximizes (given that one has new preferences) to keep and act on them post-. We can 
now solve the intention problem, which was: To rationally intend to do x, one needs 
conclusive reason to do x; but since one disprefers retaliation's harms, one has no reason 
to retaliate, and so can't intend it. So one would not retaliate given the choice. Thus, one 
can not deter by intending it. Our solution: It would best serve the preference that harms 
be minimal to acquire a modified set of preferences in which one prefers that harms be 
minimal only provided attacks are met with retaliation. So preferring, one now has a 
reason to retaliate, for it now maximizes on one's new preferences. And one's intention 
will now deter, for were one rational, one would act on it. So it is now rational to intend 
to retaliate. 
     Now Kavka and David Lewis considered a similar proposal.
22
 But both thought it 
would not be rational to acquire a preference to retaliate and to act on it, because just that 
you have such a preference does not mean retaliating is all things considered rational 
given the totality of your preferences. Your new preference might not accord with the 
rest; action on it might not maximize given all of them. In that case, you should refrain 
from acting on it post-attack, and indeed, should give it up. But I say one must not just 
acquire a preference for retaliation, but must revise one's total preference set into one in 
which retaliation is preferred over everything else if there has been an attack, and in 
which the minimization of harms is otherwise always preferred. Since it is rational to act 
as one most prefers, and since, post-revision, one most prefers to retaliate given an attack, 
that is rational. 
 
10. Conclusion 
 
How do we come down on our original four problems? Well, one cannot rationally intend 
or rationally perform a non-maximizing action, but it is sometimes rational to so change 
one's preferences as to convert a non-maximizing action into a maximizing one, upon 
which one can both rationally intend and rationally perform it. The rationality of 
intending and acting are linked: one can only rationally intend a maximizing and so 
rational action. But whether an action is rationally intendable and performable depends 
on the prior question of whether one's current preferences regarding it are rational; and 
they are  
not if it maximizes to revise them so that one can adopt an intention advantageous by 
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their original standard. This position is odd in its own ways, doubtless now troubling the 
reader. Admittedly, there are puzzles, though I think they can all be solved. Most of these 
I will have to leave for another occasion
23
, though I will speak briefly of some of them in 
the next section. But I hope I've already said enough to show that this position has what 
Gauthier desired in his solution, whatever its own vices. 
     More importantly, the problems Gauthier faced are instructive for thinking about 
rational intentions and plans in general. They show that the fields of action theory and 
decision and game theory need radical revamping. For all these problems arise from two 
assumptions common in those fields, first, that a choice is practically rational if it 
advances one's preferences, second, that instrumental rationality involves only how to 
choose given one's preferences. This, of course, engenders paradox, for it can advance 
one's preferences to commit to the performance of actions that do not advance one's 
preferences. But the paradoxes only arise through a narrow-mindedness about the power 
of instrumental rationality to adjudicate the rationality of preferences themselves. Indeed, 
the first dogma falsifies the second: If it is rational to do whatever will advance one's 
preferences, since it will sometimes advance one's preferences to have different 
preferences, it is false that a rational choice is always a choice given one's current 
preferences. In fact, a choice is only rational if it advances preferences it is rational to 
have; and it is irrational to keep preferring something if revising one's preferences would 
advance their own satisfaction. This explains how it is possible to advantage oneself by a 
rational commitment to perform an initially non-advantageous act: it is rational to change 
what one prefers where it advances what one prefers not to prefer it, namely, where it 
most advances one's preferences to so prefer as to be able to rationally perform an action 
that does not advance one's original preferences. 
 
11. Prolegomenon 
 
I acknowledged earlier that my proposal might seem to give rise to its own puzzles and 
paradoxes. I cannot take up all of these possible worries here, but perhaps I should say a 
word about one or two of them. First, it might be thought that the preference to retaliate if 
attacked is mad. Well, perhaps it is, in some moral sense. But my only concerns here are 
with whether it is instrumentally rational to acquire it given that one begins with 
preferences which it advances to supplant with this odd preference, and whether an agent 
in the situations here considered can be said to choose rationally if he does not first so 
revise his preferences. If pressed, however, I would also argue that the retaliatory 
preference is not morally mad or monstrous in the circumstances, that is, considering the 
context of its acquisition. But that would take at least another paper to show.
24
 
     Secondly, it might be thought that, since the maximizing conception of rationality says 
it is rational to choose so as to advance one's current preferences, and since I am 
recommending that agents sometimes change their preferences as a means of advancing 
their original preferences, my proposal deprives the maximization standard of its frame of 
reference in present preferences. I do not believe that my proposal has this effect, 
however. Rather, it expressly preserves that frame of reference. At any time of choice, 
one is to choose from whatever preferences one then has. But some circumstances in 
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effect present one with a problem of choice among preferences given one's present 
preferences. Such, I claim, is the case in the DD. Here, before choosing among actions, 
one must first choose among possible preferences. The reason: to choose here 
immediately among intended actions without first choosing among preferences, is non-
maximizing; it maximizes to choose first among preferences. Since one's enemies can be 
deterred only if they see that one would find it rational to retaliate, and since one would 
only find it rational to retaliate if one preferred to retaliate given an attack, one must 
choose to acquire as one's strongest preference, the preference to retaliate if attacked. 
One's initial preference that harms be minimal thus justifies as a maximizing choice, 
choosing to have new preferences. Thereafter, if one is attacked, since one then has new 
preferences, and since it is always rational to maximize on whatever preferences one has 
when facing a choice, one must, to maximize on the new preference to retaliate if 
attacked, now choose to retaliate. In this second choice, one does not face a choice among 
preferences, since one now has no reason to change one's preferences again. (One no 
longer prefers that harms be minimal simpliciter, so that old preference can give one no 
reason to revert to one's original values.) Given that one now prefers that retaliation 
occur, the only thing that could make it rational to change that preference, is if so 
changing it were necessary to causing retaliation. E.g., suppose the attackee were 
accosted by someone paternalistically concerned for his character. This paternalist will 
not let the attackee retaliate, but will retaliate for him provided the attackee comes to 
prefer that there be no further harms. The attackee would then find it maximizing to 
acquire pacifist preferences as a means to securing retaliation. But the attackee does not 
in fact have to deal with the paternalist in the classic Deterrence Dilemma. Rather, post-
attack, he faces a choice among retaliating or refraining from retaliating. And since he 
prefers to retaliate if attacked, and since he has now been attacked, it is now maximizing 
for him to retaliate. So: one maximizes, prior to a possible attack, by acquiring a 
dominant preference to retaliate if attacked; and, after attack, one maximizes on that new 
preference in retaliating. Throughout, one always maximizes on the preferences one has 
at the time of choice.
25
 
     Finally, it may seem odd that one could satisfy a preference by changing it. If I no 
longer have a preference for x, how can the obtaining of x yield me any satisfaction? To 
give an example rather more stark than that provided by the DD, consider the Gift 
Dilemma: I will give you something, x, which you now want very badly to have, just if 
you come to want very badly not to have it. Now it may seem that if you come to 
disprefer x, me then giving you x will not satisfy you; and if a rational agent always aims 
at his own satisfaction, it may then seem that it is not rational to change your preferences. 
     But this worry implies a misunderstanding, I think, of the nature of preference 
satisfaction and of the way in which it is relevant to the rationality of choices. First, let us 
distinguish between satisfaction and utility. One's preference for x is satisfied simply by 
the obtaining of x. Utility is what one gets when one of one's preferences is satisfied at 
the same time as one has that preference. So you get utility from the satisfaction of a 
preference for x just in case x comes to obtain while you still prefer that it obtain. But 
rational agents must maximize not their individual utility, but their individual expected 
utility. That is, they must choose so as to make as high as possible the product of the 
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probability and preferability by the measure of their current preferences, the outcomes of 
their choices. Plainly it is possible for circumstances to be such that something one 
prefers to obtain can only be caused to obtain by one's ceasing to prefer it. In the 
Deterrence Dilemma, I can only cause the obtaining of conditions with no harms in them 
by ceasing to prefer always to minimize harms. In the Gift Dilemma, I can only cause the 
obtaining of the condition of me owning x by ceasing to prefer owning x. In both 
dilemmas, by changing my preferences, I cause them to be satisfied. Now it is true that, 
in the case of the Gift Dilemma, the satisfaction of my original preference will not give 
me any utility, for utility is the obtaining of a preferred condition while it is preferred, 
and to cause the obtaining of the originally preferred condition, I had to cease preferring 
it by the time of its obtaining. But this is no objection to the rationality of me changing 
my preferences, for the aim of rational agents is to try to cause the satisfaction of their 
preferences, not the utility of satisfying them. And in changing my preferences in the Gift 
Dilemma, I do so cause their satisfaction, for I cause to be likely the obtaining of the 
conditions I originally preferred at the time of choosing among preferences. Matters 
would have been different had I had not just the preference to own x, but also the 
preference to enjoy it while owning it. One can only enjoy owning x if one still prefers to 
own it at the time one comes to own it. So it would not have been maximizing for me to 
revise my preferences if they had consisted in both a preference to own x, and a 
preference to enjoy the owning of x. But not all preference functions contain both a 
preference for something and the preference to enjoy the obtaining of that something. 
E.g., in preferring that one's family inherit one's fortune when one dies, one is not at the 
same time preferring to be around to enjoy their financial security when one dies; one 
knows perfectly well that one won't be around to enjoy anything when one is dead. But 
that doesn't mean it is somehow irrational to prefer that one's family inherit one's fortune, 
nor irrational to take steps to secure that condition, e.g., to make out a will. Indeed, I offer 
the case of inheritance as a counter-example to any philosophers who think that the aim 
of all rational choice is utility--the enjoyment of conditions--and not mere satisfaction--
the obtaining of conditions that one currently prefers to have obtain at some time. (The 
only cases in which one must aim at utility are those in which one's preferences are, in 
effect, preferences for utility, as I have defined it. And even in those cases, one tries to 
cause utility not because doing so is integral to the structure of rationality, but because 
causing oneself to have utility is, in those cases, necessary to causing the satisfaction of 
one's preferences; for in those cases, they are preferences for utility.) The only way I can 
rationally prefer that events obtain after my death, and the only way I can rationally 
choose in light of such preferences, is if it is not a necessary condition of the satisfaction 
of such preferences, that I will still (be around to) have them at the time of their 
satisfaction; that is, if it is not necessary to the satisfaction of every preference that the 
condition it is a preference for obtain concurrently with the obtaining of that preference.
26
 
  
19 
                               Notes 
 
                                                 
1. For helpful discussion and/or correspondence, I am grateful to Neera Badhwar, David 
Braybrooke, Robert Bright, Douglas Butler, Peter Danielson, Gregory Kavka, Carl 
Matheson, Robert Martin, Victoria McGeer, Geoffrey Sayre-McCord, Howard Sobel, 
Terry Tomkow, Kadri Vihvelin, Michael Webster, Sheldon Wein, an anonymous referee 
for this Journal, and especially Julia Colterjohn and Richmond Campbell. My thanks as 
well to the audience at the 1988 meetings of the Canadian Philosophical Association to 
which part of an earlier version was presented, especially to the commentator, David 
Zimmerman. I thank Dalhousie University for the Killam Post-Doctoral Fellowship 
which funded early work on this project. 
2. David Gauthier, "Deterrence, Maximization, and Rationality," Ethics 94 (1984), pp. 
479-480. 
3. Gregory Kavka, "Some Paradoxes of Deterrence," in John Perry and Michael Bratman, 
Michael, eds., Introduction to Philosophy: Classical and Contemporary Readings (New 
York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), pp. 516-526. Originally published in 
The Journal of Philosophy, 75 (1978), pp. 285-302. 
4. Kavka, "Some Paradoxes," and Gregory Kavka, "Responses to the Paradox of 
Deterrence," in Douglas Maclean, ed., The Security Gamble: Deterrence Dilemmas in the 
Nuclear Age (Totowa, N.J.: Rowan and Allenheld, 1984), pp. 155-159. 
5. See Gauthier, "Deterrence," pp. 479-480, 482-483, 486-488; also, David Gauthier, 
Morals By Agreement (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), Chs. I, V, VI, and IX. 
6. The following arguments are from Gauthier, "Deterrence," pp. 479-480, 482-483, 486-
489, and from David Gauthier, "Afterthoughts," in Maclean, The Security Gamble, pp. 
159-161. 
7. Mark Vorobej, "Gauthier on Deterrence," Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review, 
XXV (1986), pp. 471-476. 
8. E.g., see J. Howard Sobel, "Maximizing, Optimizing, and Prospering," Dialogue: 
Canadian Philosophical Review, XXVII (1989), pp. 233-262. 
9. Vorobej, "Gauthier."      
10. I will argue that it is rational to change one's preferences so that one could then intend 
to retaliate, having reason to keep to the intention in one's new preferences. But that is 
not Gauthier's solution for it alters one's over-all preference-functions, which he thinks 
can remain constant. 
  
20 
                                                                                                                                                 
11. It might be rational to come to prefer the keeping of promises, then to promise. But 
that is not Gauthier's solution, for he holds preferences constant. 
12. It is sometimes tempting to read Gauthier as suggesting something like this for the 
Prisoner's Dilemma. E.g., see Gauthier, Morals By Agreement, pp. 2, 3, 79, 158, 168-9, 
188. 
13. The agent may object to adopting such devices to secure deterrence. But then, as 
David Lewis would point out, he is not in a DD; his predicament is irrelevant to our case. 
See his, "Devil's Bargains and the Real World," in Maclean, The Security Gamble, p. 
142. 
14. Kavka, "Some Paradoxes," p. 521. 
 
15. Gregory Kavka, "The Toxin Puzzle," Analysis 43 (1983), pp. 33-36. 
16. Some actions may be preferred for their own sakes, but retaliation is here initially 
dispreferred. 
17. I adopt Myles Brand on individuating intentions, actions and events. See his, 
Intending and Acting: Toward a Naturalized Action Theory, (A Bradford Book, The MIT 
Press: Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1984). 
18. For more on this, see my, "Libertarian Agency and Rational Morality: Action-
Theoretic Objections to Gauthier's Dispositional Solution of the Compliance Problem," 
The Southern Journal of Philosophy, XXVI (1988), pp. 499-525. 
19. I argue, in my "Libertarian Agency," that this is impossible for such dispositions in 
general, by examining how similar ones may figure in Gauthier's attempted solution to 
the problem of guaranteeing compliance with agreements to co-operate in Prisoner's 
Dilemmas. 
20. An analogy: I resolve to kill you with slow-acting poison in your soup. You drink it; I 
have a change of heart. Too late, there is no antidote; you die with me holding your hand, 
weeping apologies. Now, I freely, voluntarily, and rationally killed you. But I did not 
choose, after you drank, to kill you. And killing you is not a free, rational, and voluntary 
action which I chose to perform after you drank. (Thanks to Robert Martin for this point.) 
21. For an attempt to show that, by his own conception of practical rationality, his theory 
of the rationality of co-operation only works if the CM disposition is a revised preference 
set with an over-riding preference for co-operation with those with similar preferences, 
see my "Two Gauthiers?," Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review XXVIII (1989), pp. 
43-61, and my "Co-operative Solutions to the Prisoner's Dilemma," Philosophical Studies 
64 (1991), pp. 309-321. 
  
21 
                                                                                                                                                 
22. See Lewis, "Devil's Bargains," pp. 153-154, and a comment in the notes to Kavka, 
"Responses." 
23. See notes 24-26, below. 
24. For more on this, and for an attempt to make the idea of practically motivated, 
rational revisions in one's preferences seem less counter-intuitive, see my, "Preference 
Revision and the Paradoxes of Instrumental Rationality," forthcoming, Canadian Journal 
of Philosophy, and my "Kavka Revisited: Some Paradoxes of Deterrence Dissolved,"  
unpublished manuscript, Dalhousie University, 1990 
25. For more on how my proposal preserves the frame of reference of rational choices in 
present preferences, see my "Preference's Progress: Rational Self-Alteration and the 
Rationality of Morality," Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review, 30 (1991) 3-32. In 
that paper, I also apply the proposal to the analysis of morality as a solution to the 
Prisoners' Dilemma, and relate the proposal to the conative structure of conclusive 
reasons for action. 
26. For more on the apparent paradoxes in the idea of revising preferences to satisfy 
them, and for an attack on other conceptions of practical rationality, see my "Persons and 
the Satisfaction of Preferences: Problems in the Rational Kinematics of Values," 
unpublished manuscript, Dalhousie University, 1991. My thanks to the reader for this 
Journal for raising some of the issues discussed in the last section. 
